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FOREWORD
In April 1996, the Army War College's Strategic Studies
Institute held its Seventh Annual Strategy Conference. This
year's theme was, "China into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner
and . . . or Peer Competitor."
Dr. June Tuefel Dreyer, Professor of Political Science at
the University of Miami, on a panel examining "China's Strategic
View," argued that the armed forces of China, although large,
simply are not capable today of militarily endorsing the kind of
truculent actions recently undertaken in the Taiwan Straits. The
qualitative advantage possessed by the sum total of Asian nations
with interests at stake, not to mention those of the United
States, exceeds that of the People's Liberation Army. Professor
Dreyer provides a good overview of the current and projected
strengths of the PLA's land, sea and air forces.
Pressure is growing throughout the Pacific and around the
world for China to attenuate hard line positions of the past. Dr.
Dreyer argues that the PRC's actions may be eliciting equal and
opposite reactions from states that feel their interests are
being threatened. On the other hand, domestic pressures may make
it difficult for the Chinese leadership to back away from some of
the positions they have taken.
The course China pursues into the 21st century will directly
bear on the strategic interests of the United States in a
significant way--and vice-versa. For this reason, the Strategic
Studies Institute offers Dr. Dreyer's views for your
consideration.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
olonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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CHINA'S STRATEGIC VIEW:
THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
China's Strategic View.
Although the militant rhetoric of past decades has abated,
the leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
profoundly dissatisfied with the international status quo. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union weakened China's ability to wrest
concessions from the United States by threatening to move closer
to the USSR, and from the USSR by threatening to support the
United States. While some leverage can, and is, gained by
negotiating with the major successor state to the Soviet Union,
this leverage is more limited than in the past. The Russian
Republic is significantly weaker than the USSR, and finds aid and
investment from capitalist states such as the United States
useful to its rebuilding efforts. It is unlikely to jeopardize
this aid by becoming too closely associated with Chinese
positions that these countries oppose.
Other indications are that the Chinese leadership's goal is
to replace the United States as the hegemonic power in the Asian
region. It sees the PRC as an ascendant power while America,
which has withdrawn from bases in the Philippines, downsized its
military personnel, slashed its defense procurement programs, and
consigned its navy to a littoral role, is seen as declining.
Should China assume the role of hegemon, there are likely to be
territorial readjustments in the region. The PRC contests
ownership of several different islands and island chains with no
less than six other countries, and there are concerns within
India that the close relationship that has developed between
China and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in
Burma may have a Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean as one of
its goals. Though Sino-Indian relations have been quite good in
recent years, there are unresolved issues between the two
countries, and China's victory over India in a 1962 border war
is a painful memory for many Indians.
The PLA and the Formulation of Chinese Strategy.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) plays a dual role
in the country's strategic view: it participates in the
formulation of strategy at the same time as it is charged with
implementing that strategy. The apparent active involvement of
higher echelons of the PLA in formulating national policy sets
the Chinese military apart from the Western ideal in which
politicians decide upon policy and the military implements it.
Several caveats are in order here. Mao Zedong formulated a
principle that is not very different from the Western ideal of
the separation of army and politics: "the party must always
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control the gun; the gun must never control the party." And
Clausewitz, though saying that "there can be no question of a
purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a
purely military scheme to solve it," also cautioned that
political leaders should be careful not to ask the impossible of
the military, and advised them to consult with senior commanders
in planning and conducting military operations.1 Finally,
virtually all the recent information indicating that the PLA is
exerting pressure for a harder line internationally comes from
the Hong Kong press and cannot be confirmed through mainland
sources. Hence, the dichotomy between the role of the military in
the PRC and that in the West may be overdrawn.
Analysts of recent Chinese foreign policy portray it as a
struggle between soft liners and hard liners. Those who espouse a
soft line believe that the PRC's best interests are served by
negotiating settlements to China's territorial disputes with
other nations and engaging foreign powers in dialogue on
contentious issues such as trade disputes and intellectual
property rights. Hard liners assume a more defiant posture. The
doctrine of absolute sovereignty, the unilateral right of the PRC
to annex territory it considers part of the sacred territory of
China, and a skeptical attitude toward the claims of other
countries characterize their stance. According to the Hong Kong
press, the PLA is definitely in the hard line group.
There is no conclusive evidence that this is the case. Much
of the characterization of the PLA as urging a more militant
international stance cites rumors.2 There is no confirmation more
convincing than noting that a high-ranking PLA officer, usually
the vice-chair of the party's Central Military Commission (CMC)
Liu Huaqing, is present when militant policy pronouncements are
given. It is, however, equally possible that the leadership would
want to have a high-ranking military figure on hand simply to
symbolize the country's determination to back up its strong
statements. The fact that the officer is physically present does
not necessarily mean that he had any part in formulating the
policies being announced.
When interviewed last year, Western military attaches who
have served in China tended to reject the idea of a PLA
corporate view on international relations that it is urging on
the civilian leadership. One Western officer stated that he had
tried to confirm the existence of the numerous joint letters that
the Hong Kong press has reported that military leaders send
urging the leadership to take a stronger stand on some issue, and
has been able to do so with only one of the missives: that
circulated just before the attack on demonstrators in 1989. It
should be noted that this letter concerned a domestic matter
rather than an international one, and also that it urged a soft
line rather than a hard line: the generals opposed the use of
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force against the demonstrators. Moreover, as one Western
intelligence operative points out, there is no need for PLA
leaders to write letters to the leadership: they have input into
the policy process at a variety of levels, and can make their
views known long before decisions are made. And, at the very
highest level, Liu Huaqing, the senior member of the Central
Military Commission, is a member of the Standing Committee of the
party Politburo. Recently, Western analysts seem more willing to
credit reports that at least certain elements of the military
have been in the forefront of the PRC's more aggressive policies.
Two other points should be noted with regard to the PLA's
views on China's strategic posture: first, the top echelons of
the officer corps do not necessarily share a common point of
view. And, second, the advice they give is not necessarily
militaristic. With regard to the first point, factionalism has
been an ongoing characteristic of the PLA's high command. While
the presence of differences of opinion within any sizeable
organization is hardly surprising, the communist leadership has
adamantly opposed such differences, and frequently warns that any
deviations from its model of a unified force marching forward
under the party line will simply not be tolerated. Since the
official press mentions factionalism within the military from
time to time, it must be assumed that such factionalism continues
to exist. The last public manifestation thereof occurred from
late 1992 through early 1993. Generals Yang Shangkun and Yang
Baibing and at least several hundred officers associated with
them were removed from power, reportedly for trying to make plans
for the post-Deng Xiaoping era. The purgees were accused of
trying to place their supporters in positions of power, and of
discussing how to prevent the outbreak of civil disorder after
the death of Deng. Their concerns were therefore centered on
personal power and internal problems rather than international
security matters.
The weakening of the Yangs cannot be assumed to have ended
factionalism in the high command: as one Western intelligence
analyst commented at the time, opposition to the Yang clique had
been the one issue uniting the other members of the CMC. Recent
attention has focussed on an alleged "Shandong clique" and its
control of the military. Here there is supportive indirect
evidence. Of the 175 top-ranking PLA officers listed in the
latest (1994) edition of the Beijing-published reference work
Who's Who in China: Current Leaders, 46, or 26.3 percent are
from Shandong, a province with only 7.2 percent of the PRC's
population.3 Shandong natives also comprise one-third of the
Central Military Commission's nine members; the commander and
commissar of the navy were born in Shandong, as were four of the
fourteen (29 percent) commanders and commissars of the PRC's
seven military regions.4 In describing preparations for the
February- March PLA exercises in the southeastern province of
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Fujian, the pro-communist newspaper Wen Wei Po noted that "large
amounts of Shandong cabbage, which southerners do not like to
eat, appeared in the market."5 Wen Wei Po made no attempt at
interpreting this datum, apparently because it assumed that its
readers would understand that where there is a heavy military
presence, there will be many natives of Shandong. Observers are
agreed that this Shandong clique is a personalistic network
rather than one which espouses a policy point of view. This does
not necessarily mean that high-ranking officials are comfortable
with its continued existence: an article in another Hong Kong
paper in February 1996 interpreted several recent personnel
changes in the PLA as part of Jiang Zemin's effort to weaken the
Shandong group's power by promoting people from his native
province of Jiangsu.6
It is also entirely likely, though more difficult to verify,
that differences of opinion exist within the military leadership
on policy toward Taiwan and with regard to specific issues
confronting the deployment of the PLA garrison in Hong Kong, as
well as broader strategic issues involving the major powers of
the world. The December 1995 issue of a Beijing-published
magazine on militia work contained a major article emphasizing
the need for members of the people's armed forces to "willingly
subordinate themselves to the overall situation whenever local
interests clash with overall ones," and to do whatever the party
orders.7 At the same time, a Hong Kong publication, citing
mainland sources, reported that Fujian leaders were complaining
that the PLA's frequent military exercises in their area were
hurting the local economy.8
With regard to the second point, there is no conclusive
evidence to support the assumption that what advice the PLA gives
favors an assertive strategic stance. Most officers are
patriotic: they are proud of their country, want it to be
internationally respected, and support the territorial claims
made by China's civilian leadership. However, they are also
acutely aware--perhaps more so than most civilian leaders--of the
PLA's military deficiencies. The authors of the controversial Can
China Win the Next War,9 published in mid-1993, consider the
equipment and manpower available to the country in a variety of
scenarios, and are not optimistic that they will be victorious in
most of them. There is an entire section entitled "The Next War
Will Not Be So Easy"; the document is studded with statements
such as " . . . the problem of the return of Taiwan is better
resolved by peaceful means than by armed force"10 and "holding on
to the Nansha Islands is a big question mark."11 There are some
problems with the document,12 and the authors are unabashed
advocates of a specific vested interest: the PLA navy's need for
an aircraft carrier. But it is important to note that the message
being delivered is conservative: the authors' message is that it
would not be a good idea for the PRC to become involved in a
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confrontation unless or until existing military deficiencies are
rectified.
A Western intelligence source conjectures that in recent
months high-ranking Chinese naval and air force officers may have
been more supportive of a militant stance in the Spratly Islands
and Taiwan. They, rather than the PRC's ground forces, have
received the benefits of increases in the defense budget, and
hence are apt to be eager to test their new capabilities. He
believes that CMC vice-chair Liu Huaqing, a former PLA navy
commander, plays an active role in this scenario.
The PLA's Ability to Support Chinese Strategy.
The PLA has not been regarded as a potent fighting force.
Its four million men were poorly trained; weapons technology was
10-20 years behind the state of the art; and logistics support
was woefully inadequate. Although this force could have been
expected to fight valiantly on the exceedingly unlikely
circumstance that an outside power should choose to invade the
PRC, the PLA had very limited ability to project power beyond the
mainland's borders. Its performance against Vietnam in February
1979 was abysmal, thus giving impetus to those officers and
civilian leaders who had argued for years that the PLA could not
make a strong showing in combat.13 Under Deng Xiaoping, who served
for many years as head of the PLA's General Staff Department and
later headed the party's CMC, ameliorative measures were
introduced.
Over the course of 10 years, a demobilization removed more
than one million soldiers from the PLA. Its current strength is
estimated at just under three million; further reductions are
likely. Educational requirements were instituted for officers.
Military academies increasingly focussed on military training and
academic subjects, while decreasing the attention given to
political and ideological courses. The military rank system,
which had been abolished in 1964 in a move toward radical
egalitarianism that foreshadowed the Cultural Revolution, was
reinstated. A large number of elderly officers were induced to
retire. In order to perpetuate this rejuvenation of the officer
corps, a military service law instituted an "up or out" system,
with mandatory retirement for senior officers at age 65.
Doctrine shifted away from the expectation of a massive
apocalyptic war involving the superpowers and concentrated on
preparing for local and regional conflicts. Command, control,
communications and intelligence improved. Training exercises were
conducted more frequently and in a more sophisticated fashion.
Efforts were made to coordinate air, sea, and land forces. The
exercises were conducted under more varied conditions, from the
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dry mountainous north to the jungles of the southwest. And their
outcome was no longer predetermined: whereas the red team had had
to triumph before, the blue team was now allowed to win if its
performance was superior. Naval vessels began to venture further
from coastal waters, prompting observers to note that the PLAN
was moving toward a modest blue-water capability. The country's
nuclear program continued to progress. The International
Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that the PRC has 17
intercontinental ballistic missiles and more than 70
intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Its one nuclear- powered
Xia-class submarine is equipped with 12 warheads.14 China's recent
nuclear testing program shows a developing capability for
miniaturization.
The modernization of non-nuclear weapons proceeded more
slowly. There was indecision about what and how much to import
from which foreign countries, with a vocal faction opposing
imports and advocating self-reliance and indigenous development.
Foreign procurement projects were bedeviled by additional
problems. There were lengthy negotiations on price and method of
payment. For example, while China preferred to settle accounts
with Russia through barter, Russia preferred hard currency.15 The
PRC terminated discussions on the procurement of the Su-30, a
two-seat, long-duration derivative of the Su-27 after Russia
insisted that the barter payment be lowered to 50 percent instead
of 75 percent.16 Cost overruns and political problems with
supplier countries caused delays and a few cancellations. Both
factors were involved in China's 1990 decision to terminate its
Peace Pearl project for upgrading its F-8 fighter plane. With an
arms embargo imposed by the United States after the bloody
suppression of demonstrations in Beijing in 1989, Russia and
Israel have emerged as the PRC's major foreign suppliers of arms
and technology.

Air Force. Russia has sold 72 Su-27s to China in three
separate deals over the past 4 years. Whereas the first 24 were
basic models, later shipments are rumored to include improved
variants with both attack and multi-role capability. Aviation
experts describe the Su-27 as among the most modern, capable
fighter planes in the world. It has a state-of-the-art weapon
system and can utilize a wide variety of air-to-air and air-toground ordnance.17 A second plane being developed is the FC-1
lightweight fighter based on the design for the MiG-33 rejected
by the Soviet Air Force. Israel and several European countries
are being considered as suppliers for the plane's avionics.18 A
third fighter plane, the J-10 (F-10), multi-role fighter is based
on technology developed for the U.S.-financed Lavi fighter
program, which was cancelled in 1987. It is unclear what specific
technologies and systems Israel has provided. Some experts
believe that the Israeli contribution will focus on avionics and
radar, with Russia supplying the engines.19
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There is a tendency to overstate what this means for combat
capability. While a reporter for Jane's Defence Weekly trumpeted
that "China's double-digit economic growth is funding three major
combat aircraft development programmes at a time when the whole
of Europe can barely afford two,"20 other sources portray a far
different situation. A former Air Force attache in Beijing points
out that production of one of the three planes, the FC-1 is a
joint project with Pakistan with the plane designed for export.
He does not believe that China will be able to afford to procure
both J-10s and Soviet planes, and sees the J-10 as the more
probable choice since it is more acceptable to the faction that
favors indigenous development and production of weapons. However,
he cautions, it may be a long time before the J-10 is
operational. China's A-2 attack plane was not deployed until 8
years after its initial test flight, and there is no reason to
think that the J-10 will enter service any faster. Problems have
occurred which hamper production and, in this expert's view, the
plane is unlikely to be deployed before 2004.
Despite Western journalists' description of sales of Soviet
weapons to China as "a fire sale," the Su-27 purchase was no
bargain: at a cost of $1 billion for 26 planes, this works out to
nearly $40 million per plane, the fact that 35 percent of the
cost was in barter notwithstanding. Disagreements over price
meant that the second batch of planes was sitting out in harsh
Russian weather for more than 2 years, suffering significant
deterioration. Metal fatigue has been a problem. The final batch
will have suffered even more. Chinese maintenance procedures are
poor: of 24 Sikorsky helicopters purchased from the United States
12 years ago, only 3 or 4 are still in service. PLA air force
(PLAAF) pilots train only about 80 hours a year on the average.
They almost never practice over water--surely a major deficiency
in preparing for the type of missions they are likely to have in
a confrontation involving disputed islands. The PRC's pilots are,
moreover, reluctant to push an aircraft to the edge of its
capabilities. The former attache predicts that after the first
Su-27 crashes, pilots will be still more reluctant to push the
envelope. While Russian trainers complain about Chinese pilots,
the Chinese note that the planes arrived without training
manuals. They are also causing damage to Chinese runways, which
were constructed for lighter planes than the Su-27.21
Taiwan sources independently confirm these points, with one
officer describing the planes as having "a very low operational
readiness capability due to poor logistics and maintenance. The
number of takeoffs and flights is not frequent." He was skeptical
that the licensing agreement allowing the PRC to produce Su-27s
would result in mass production of the plane, predicting that the
mainlanders would encounter real difficulties in providing the
necessary logistical support and maintenance to ensure an
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acceptable operational readiness capability for the final
product.22 And a former New York Times correspondent reported
that, even after lengthy training in Russia, the Chinese pilots
designated to take over the Su-27s were so unskilled that Russian
pilots had to deliver the planes to Chinese bases.23 Yet another
observer of the Chinese military, noting the difficulties that
PRC pilots were having with Su-27s, predicted that the planes
would "leak into the PLAAF's inventory rather than pour in."24

Navy. Naval capabilities have been upgraded with more
success. Until about 15 years ago, PLAN lacked surface-to-air
missile (SAM) protection for its ships, which were equipped
solely with guns and had no surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).
It had very little anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.
Western analysts doubted that the Chinese navy would be
effective, even against smaller navies, once its ships left the
mainland's coast. This has changed significantly: PLAN is now
better able to defend itself, even in the absence of air cover,
in contested waters such as the South China Sea.25 By the early
1990s, PLAN had a line-of-sight air defense capability out to 13
kilometers and up to 8,000 meters in altitude. Its missiles are
judged effective against aircraft as well as sea skimming
surface-to-surface or air-to-surface anti-ship missiles. The PL-8
missile, believed to have been derived from the Israeli Python,
is infrared guided, can detect a target from any angle, and can
be mounted on a ship along with anti-aircraft guns. More
sophisticated radars reach to the horizon and allow the
identification of targets for anti-ship SSMs. Electronic
countermeasures have also improved.
China's destroyers have been equipped with both SAM and SSM
systems. Anti-submarine warfare has improved to what one Western
analyst describes as good to fair depending on the size, nature,
and location of conflict. Given a concentrated effort of ASW
resources in a limited and shallow zone such as the East China
Sea, he believes that the PLAN could perform credibly. Dauphin
helicopters, produced under license with France, have enhanced
the PLAN's ASW capability. Since the best submarine killer is
probably another submarine, China's purchase of Kilo-class diesel
electric boats from Russia represents a significant addition to
the PRC's ASW capabilities. Two of these have already been
delivered;26 two more are expected in the near future. The latter
group will be fitted with upgraded sonars which will allow better
detection of enemy vessels. Kilos carry twelve 21-inch torpedoes
and constitute a significant upgrade from China's elderly Whisky
and Romeo class boats.
Submarines and surface combatants have been fitted with a
reverse-engineered version of France's Exocet missile; frigates
and destroyers are equipped with surface-to-air (SAM) missiles
giving them protection against air and missile attacks at sea.
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Some ships carry indigenously manufactured SAMS; others have
French-made Crotales. Ships without integral SAM capability may
carry short-range, shoulder-fired SAMs derived from the SA-7.
SSMs include the Ying Ji, derived from the Exocet. With a
relatively short 40 kilometer range, it is active radar homing
and carries a 165 kilogram warhead. The radar homing and infrared
homing HY-2 anti-ship Sea Eagle has a longer effective range of
approximately 80 kilometers. The Sea Eagle carries a 513 kilogram
warhead, and is believed nuclear-capable. The C-802 may have a
range of 120 kilometers.
These advances notwithstanding, efforts to enhance naval
capabilities have experienced problems similar to those faced by
the air force. Systems integration continues to pose
difficulties. American-made General Electric LM 2500 gas turbine
engines were purchased to power China's newest class of
destroyers, the Luhu. However, the Chinese naval architects
responsible for designing the Luhu's hull and engine space seem
to have disregarded the engines' size specifications. The hull
had to be returned to the shipyard for redesign after at least
one ship had already been built.27 The navy has over-the-horizon
missiles, but not the targeting techniques to make them
effective. And, after more than a decade of efforts to improve
educational standards, difficulties remain. A 1995 story reported
in the Chinese press described a junior-high school educated
radarman assigned to submarine duty who could not maintain the
equipment he was responsible for.28

Ground Forces. As might be expected, the world's largest
country has the world's largest army, comprising about 2.2
million people. Ground forces include 24 group armies, equivalent
to Western corps, composed of 73 infantry divisions, 9 main force
divisions with a rapid-reaction role, 11 tank divisions, and 5
artillery divisions. This does not include garrison forces,
border and coastal guards, People's Armed Police, or reservists.
The last category is estimated at about 900,000 men, the majority
of them demobilized veterans of the regular armed forces.29
They are equipped with large numbers of weapons--for
example, an estimated 7,500 to 8,000 medium battle tanks. Most
are copies of older Soviet models, though Israeli technology has
upgraded the turrets and fire control systems of a number of
these. Ground force modernization has received a lower priority
than that of the navy and air force, and neither troops nor their
equipment are believed to be of high quality. Since Deng's
economic reforms provided opportunities to become wealthy through
entrepreneurial activities, the best and the brightest young men
generally do not wish to join the PLA. The fact that the military
is expected to raise much of its own meat and vegetables detracts
from training.

9

So does the PLA's multi-faceted business empire and the
corruption it has engendered. Durability of equipment is a
recurrent problem. Artillery tubes deteriorate quickly in heavy
firing, degrading accuracy and posing hazards to gun crews. Tires
on Chinese vehicles are substandard; drive trains and
transmissions break down far too frequently.30 The Thai military,
which bought a number of Chinese tanks at bargain prices,
complains that treads wear out prematurely and fire control
systems need excessive maintenance.31 There are exceptions: the
23rd and 54th armies are described as highly disciplined and
motivated, with good equipment maintenance procedures. The 1st
and 31st armies are also well regarded, as are the 15th Airborne
Army and the marines (naval infantry).32 These are the troops that
would have to be relied on in any confrontation with China's
neighbors.
Recent Demarches.
China's present ability to project power, though still quite
limited, has improved significantly over the past two decades.
More importantly, if the leadership were to decide to pursue
aggressively the PRC's claims in disputed areas including the
Spratly Islands, the Senkakus, and Taiwan, China will have the
advantage of size. For example, its navy is, at 260,000 men,
larger than those of the seven members of ASEAN plus Taiwan
combined.33 Another advantage is that its neighbors are not united
against China, and are highly unlikely ever to be so. A number of
the ASEAN countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines,
Vietnam, and Brunei, claim parts of the Spratly Islands, and in
some cases contest ownership with each other as well as with the
PRC.
There are minor disagreements among them on other matters as
well. For example, in early 1996, Thailand voiced its displeasure
over a wall built by Malaysia on the border between the two
countries, as well as to reports that Malaysia had equipped its
coastal patrol boats with weapons to attack foreign vessels that
entered its waters for fishing.34 And the Vietnamese government
recently demanded that Thailand cease violating its territorial
waters.35 In addition to its differences with China over the
Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands, Japan contests ownership of Takeshima
Island with Korea; the island is known to Koreans as Tokto.36
While these are fairly mild irritants, they illustrate a more
important point: there is not necessarily an "us versus them"
view of China.
Several navies, including Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia,
have a qualitative advantage over China in terms of more modern
ships equipped with Harpoon and Exocet anti-ship missiles. But it
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is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which these or
other ASEAN countries could combine, much less that they could be
joined by Taiwan--with whom none of them has formal diplomatic
relations--to resist a PRC bent on expansion.
Japan presents a different picture. Its highly competent
navy has modern ships equipped with state-of-the-art weaponry and
staffed by well-educated officers and men. The Japanese navy has
twice the underway replenishment capacity of China. However,
article nine of the Japanese constitution forbids the use of
force to solve international disputes and there is a wellorganized, articulate anti-defense sector within the country's
population. However, just as with the ASEAN states, it is
difficult to imagine the circumstances under which Japan would
wish to challenge the PRC militarily.
Until fairly recently, Asian-Pacific states tended to take
a rather detached view of "the Chinese threat," believing that
disputes with the PRC would be settled in due course through
peaceful negotiations. For example, in mid-1993, then-Australian
defense minister Robert Ray pointed out that there would be at
least several years' warning time before any major threat
actually materialized.37 That period of warning appears to have
begun even before Ray spoke.
Military budgets had been rising steadily since the late
1980s, and China was conducting extensive negotiations with
Russia over the purchase of military equipment. Some Soviet
weapons experts whose talents were no longer needed in their own
country found employment in the PRC. China had already become the
chief, and perhaps only, external source of support for Burma's
pariah government. Its assistance in the construction of three
highways from the border of China's Yunnan province into Burma
caused concerns that Beijing's real motive might be to use the
roads as invasion routes to take over the country. The PRC's
upgrading of naval bases at Mergui and the Cocos Islands,
including the installation of radars in the latter, was
interpreted as facilitating surveillance of the area by China's
intelligence personnel. India became concerned that the Burmese
government had provided the PRC with an outlet to the Bay of
Bengal and the Andaman Sea, where India's own navy had hitherto
held sway. Japanese diplomats were particularly uneasy about a
Chinese military presence in Mergui, near the entrance to the
Strait of Malacca, which connects the South China Sea with the
Indian Ocean. In addition to being strategically important in its
own right, this channel is as well a crucial transit point for
Middle Eastern oil shipments to Japan.
In February 1992, China's National People's Congress passed
a law asserting ownership of all contested islands: the Spratlys,
the Paracels, the Senkakus, and Taiwan. It further claimed the
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right to "adopt all necessary measures
harmful passage of vessels through its
for "PRC warships or military aircraft
This caused anxiety not only among the
islands but also among neutral nations
with established transportation routes

to prevent and stop the
territorial waters" and
to expel the intruders."38
other claimants to the
who feared interference
in and around the area.

Japanese diplomats, aware of long-standing concern within
the Chinese leadership that Japan may re-militarize, quietly
suggested that this action had strengthened right-wing forces
within their country. They also hinted that a visit from the
Japanese imperial couple which the Chinese leadership greatly
desired--anticipating an apology for Japan's actions against
China in World War II--might have to be postponed. This caused a
slight softening of the mainland's position: the Chinese foreign
ministry issued a statement saying that the law was part of a
normal domestic legislative process, did not represent a change
in Chinese policy, and would not affect the joint development of
the islands with countries involved in the dispute.39 The foreign
ministry did not, however, address the question of why it was
felt necessary to pass the law. And, since the foreign ministry's
explanation could not have had the effect of changing the
legislation, the law could be advanced again in support of
Chinese actions in the future. Moreover, a few months later,
China granted oil exploration rights in a disputed area of the
Spratlys to an American company, the Crestone Energy Corporation.
In 1995, a series of Chinese actions indicated that the pace
of assertiveness had been stepped up. In the spring, the
Philippine government announced that the PRC had built concrete
structures, including radar installations, in a contested area
known as Mischief Reef; it had also placed boundary markers meant
to demarcate China's territorial waters only 50 miles away from
the Philippines' Palawan Island. The PRC argued that the
structures had no military significance, and were solely for the
convenience of its fisherfolk. This prompted Filipino President
Fidel Ramos, a former military leader, to arrange a tour of the
installations for the media which indicated that the facilities
were more sophisticated than Chinese fishermen would normally
need or expect. Pictures were produced of PLAN vessels nearby.
Ramos also ordered the destruction of the boundary markers.
Beijing accused Manila of bullying China and warned that the
PRC's previous restraint over the Spratlys could not be
permanent. Another media tour might be resisted with armed force.
It also warned the Philippines not to involve the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the matter: the two countries
could discuss the issue bilaterally in due course.
In January 1996 Filipino anxieties were again raised by a
confrontation near Zambales between their navy and two Chinese
ships. Manila subsequently decided to downplay the issue with the

12

not very convincing explanation that the "pirate ships" were not
owned by the Chinese military but by the Chinese militia.40 The
Chinese militia does possess some boats, but they typically stay
very close to the mainland's coastline. In March, Manila revealed
that the PRC had mounted electronic equipment on its
installations on Mischief Reef, with a Filipino general
describing the new upgrades were "certainly a cause for worry."41
Only weeks after the publicity about PRC installations on
Mischief Reef, the Indonesian government made public a Chinese
map showing the Natuna Islands as part of China's exclusive
economic zone. Since the islands were not hitherto regarded as
disputed territory, and because they contain rich gas deposits,
there was immediate concern in Jakarta. Indonesian foreign
minister Ali Alatas quickly departed for Beijing where, he
announced, his Chinese counterpart had assured him that the PRC
does not claim the islands and regards them as under Indonesia's
jurisdiction.42 As with the passage of the 1992 law, however,
there remained questions as to the motivation for creating and
circulating the map.
The PRC's intention to enforce its claims in the Spratlys
and elsewhere cannot be doubted. In November 1995, a naval
expedition sent to pour more than a thousand tons of stone and
concrete onto a submerged reef in order to bolster the PRC's
claims of sovereignty in that area persevered in its task despite
hurricane-force winds and freezing temperatures. Half of its
hundred-man crew returned with pneumonia and assorted injuries.43
In the closing days of 1995, Japan revealed that the PRC had for
several months been conducting oil exploration in an area of the
Senkaku Islands, known to the Chinese as the Diaoyutai, and
claimed by Japan. One of Japan's leading dailies interpreted
China's activities in the area as "a highly political move aimed
at testing Japan."44
Yet another indication that the PRC might be in the midst of
the several years warning period envisioned by Robert Ray was the
series of nuclear tests conducted since 1994. Protests by several
nations were ignored; when Japan announced that it would suspend
its grant aid to the PRC until the tests ceased, the reaction was
belligerent: China described Japan's decision as "unwise . . .
totally unreasonable [and] harmful to Sino-Japanese relations."45
Japanese sources privately speculated that the PRC's decision to
begin oil exploration in the Senkakus had been taken in
retaliation for Japan's suspension of grants.46
The most recent manifestation of the PRC's commitment to its
territorial claims has been a series of missile tests that had
the effect of imposing a blockade of Taiwan. While China
explained that these were undertaken to deter Taiwan's President
Lee Teng-hui from declaring the island's independence and to
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discourage his drive to seek greater international recognition
for his nation's separate existence, skeptics pointed out that
Chinese actions amounted to describing the victim as the
perpetrator: unlike his major parliamentary opposition, the
Democratic Progressive Party, Lee and his fellow Kuomintang party
members had steadfastly advocated unification--albeit on an
indefinite and extended timetable. The more likely explanation,
they argued, was the PRC's desire to disrupt the island's first
direct presidential election.
The PLA and the Execution of Strategy.
As noted above, the People's Liberation Army's ability to
support an aggressive strategy is limited. This, however, assumes
that those who feel their interests have been adversely affected
are willing to resist. So far, PLA shows of strength--what some
have seen as a strategy of bluff--have been relatively successful
in intimidating its neighbors. There have been few indications
that the neighbors are disposed to fight back. Vietnamese and
Chinese gunboats exchanged fire briefly in 1984 and 1988; the
Taiwan military is put on a state of high alert when war games or
missile tests are carried out near its territory; and, when the
PRC announced that a series of tests would be conducted with live
ammunition, the United States ordered two carrier battle groups
into the area.
Non-military responses have been taken: Japan's suspension
of grant aid in response to the PRC's refusal to cease nuclear
testing is one example. Another is the founding in July 1994 of a
new organization, the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), to provide a
forum for the resolution of disputes between member countries.
Although China has joined, it has refused to discuss these
disputes except on a bilateral basis with the countries involved.
Presumably this is because the PRC's leaders fear that the image
costs of being perceived as intransigent in multilateral
negotiations are much higher than those involved in a one-on-one
bargaining situation. The sheer size of the PRC relative to most
of its neighbors also confers advantages in bilateral
negotiations. In any case, the ARF has created no dispute
resolution mechanisms, and has so far functioned only as a venue
for general discussion of issues.
There are indications that the PRC is willing to back down,
at least temporarily, under pressure. The foreign ministry's
softening the interpretation of the 1992 law unilaterally
annexing many disputed territories after Japan threatened
suspension of the imperial couple's visit is a case in point. So,
as well, is the PRC's distancing itself from what appeared to be
a claim to the Natuna Islands after the Indonesian government
protested. Other bilateral and unilateral moves by concerned
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countries indicate that the PRC's actions may be calling forth
equal and opposite reactions from the states who feel their
interests being threatened. Immediately after the Philippine
government asked the United States to relinquish its bases in
that country, Singapore offered to allow the United States to use
its facilities. Both Singapore and Malaysia undertook expensive
military modernization programs as well as reactivating the Five
Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA) with Britain, Australia, and New
Zealand.47 In 1993, India and Indonesia began holding joint naval
exercises, and in December 1995, Indonesia and Australia signed a
mutual security agreement.48 Only a few months after discovering
Chinese activities on Mischief Reef, the Philippine legislature
agreed to fund a large increase in military spending, earmarking
most of it for combat ships and sophisticated fighter planes.49
Japanese foreign ministry officials have discussed growing
perceptions of a China threat with their opposite numbers in
China, suggesting that the PRC heighten transparency on defense
issues and hold regular discussions with its counterparts.50
The sum total of these reactions may persuade the PRC to
soften its positions on a number of security issues. Yet domestic
pressures may make it difficult for the Chinese leadership to
back away from some of the stands they have taken. Jiang Zemin is
an untested leader with no power base of his own, no military
experience, and several rivals for power. On the other side of
the argument, for the PRC to court military confrontation while
armed only with forces as deficient as the PLA carries even
greater strategic risks for Jiang as well as for China.
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